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NIOSH, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory 
Pittsburgh, PA 
NIOSH researchers have been examining underground coal mining activities in order to 
evaluate work crew hazards. In 1994 a continuous mining machine operator was killed by 
falling roof during extended cut mining. Many aspects of the incident were used by NIOSH 
researchers to develop a scenario interview. The goal was to provide a realistic framework 
for acquiring frank and detailed insights. The interview consists of two sections. The first 
describes the underground mining conditions. The second recounts the fatal incident. Each 
section is supplemented by a diagram and a set of questions addressing relevant safety issues. 
The interview was administered at three mines that actively take extended cuts. Researchers 
found the scenario approach to be an effective interview tool as well as an effective hazard 
awareness and safe work practices training platform. 
INTRODUCTION 
Underground coal mining is unpredictable by 
nature and presents workers with numerous hazards. 
Many of these hazards, including roof falls, occur 
near the working face. During the 1970s remote 
control technology was introduced to increase 
productivity and improve safety. Because of this 
innovation, mine workers were able to take longer 
cuts of coal. A face advancement that exceeds 
twenty feet is considered an extended cut. Extended 
cut mining was first allowed by the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) in 1979 and has 
since been widely adopted. 
The use of extended cut mining has resulted in 
industry wide safety concerns. Removal of the 
operator from equipment may reduce exposure to 
equipment hazards but may increase exposure to 
other hazards and/or create new hazards. Human 
factors researchers at the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) were 
charged with examining extended cut mining 
activities in order to better define work crew 
hazards. This information is to be used to develop 
generalized innovations for work procedures, 
equipment redesign, and training strategies that 
improve safety. 
Ground falls have been the largest cause of 
underground coal mining fatalities. In addition, 
many victims were found to be in an area of 
unsupported roof at the time they were killed (Bauer 
et al., 1994). In 1994 a continuous mining machine 
(CM) operator was fatally injured while turning a 
cross cut during extended cut mining. The CM 
operator was struck by falling roof while extracting 
coal and may have been under unsupported top. An 
exploratory study of this incident was conducted as 
part of NIOSH extended cut mining research. 
One key finding by NIOSH researchers was the 
desire of CM operators to view the face while 
extracting coal. Establishing a physical location 
that provides a clear field of view and having 
adequate illumination were viewed as critical needs 
by CM operators (Steiner et al., 1997). It was 
discovered that these issues were exacerbated when 
turning a cross cut. 
In response to these findings, researchers 
developed a scenario interview that addressed cross 
cut safety issues. Many aspects of the 1994 fatal 
injury were incorporated into the scenario interview 
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guide. The goal of the scenario interview was to 
provide a realistic hands-on approach to acquiring 
insights from face crew members. 
THESIS 
NIOSH researchers assert that the use of a 
realistic scenario interview will result in frank and 
detailed responses from face crew members. This 
approach provides an effective means of acquiring 
worker perceptions of the types of hazards that 
exist, the relative magnitude of the hazards, and 
what could be done to reduce or eliminate hazards. 
SCENARIO INTERVIEW APPROACH 
A prototype version of the interview was 
developed to test the efficacy of this approach. Four 
face crew members were interviewed individually at 
a single underground mine site using laminated 
hand-held diagrams. Interviews were administered 
by two ergonomists with considerable experience 
interviewing underground mine workers. 
Respondents found the scenario to be realistic 
and easy to relate to. More important, interviewers 
were able to engage face workers in meaningful 
dialogs related to target safety issues. Results were 
reviewed by NIOSH human factors and mining 
researchers and characterized as open, honest, and 
insightful. A final version of the interview was 
developed using prototype findings and reviewer 
recommendations. Three mines that actively take 
extended cuts were identified for the scenario 
interview evaluation. 
The scenario interview consists of two sections. 
The first section, background information, describes 
underground mining conditions for a face crew 
turning a left cross cut. The second section recounts 
briefly a fatal injury that resulted from a roof fall 
that occurs shortly after the scenario presented in 
the background section. Each section is 
supplemented by a diagram that specifies the 
location of face crew members and equipment, and 
a set of questions. The final version of the scenario 
sections and accompanying diagrams are presented 
as Figures 1 through 4. 
Figure 1: Background Story and Questions 
The centers had been marked on the mine roof and ribs 
to start the 2 to 1 left crosscut. The # 2 entry had been 
mined 2-3 feet off center up to the last cut mined. The 
last cut in the #2 entry was brought back to center by 
offsetting to the right about 3 feet. The last row of bolts 
for the crosscut was not in direct alignment with the left 
rib bolts of the entry. 
Visible warning was not posted to prevent persons 
from inadvertently traveling inby permanent roof 
supports. The miner operator, using a Jeffery radio 
remote controlled continuous miner (CM) with left- 
mounted cable, had taken the initial lift from entry 2 to 1 
(left xcut) on the left side and was taking the 2”d lift on the 
right side. The operator mines the 2 to 1 left crosscut to 
about 3 1 feet in depth. The helper was outby the operator 
monitoring the trailing cable. 
As a CM operator on this section, 
A. What concerns would you have before starting this 
cut? 
B. What could be done about these concerns? 
C. Where would you position yourself to take this lift? 
Figure 2: Background Diagram 
Not to scale 
CM Miner Operator 
H Helper 
SC Shuttle Car Operator 
Roof Bolts 
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Figure 3: Fatal Injury Story and Questions 
The shuttle car was nearly loaded when the CM 
operator, standing at the last row of bolts, was pinned to 
the floor by a large piece of rock that fell from the top. 
CM operators had been warned to stay at least 2 rows of 
bolts back. This particular operator had been warned 
twice in the 2 months before the incident and just minutes 
before the fall. 
The width of the opening from 2 to 1 left crosscut 
was 27.5 feet. The approved roof plan requires the 
opening to be limited to 26 feet in width. 
D. Could this type of situation occur at this mine? 
YES or NO Why or why not? 
E. If YES, When would something like this most 
likely happen? 
F. Have you had any special training that would 
have helped you to better assess this situation? 
YES or NO If YES, what? 
Figure 4: Fatal Injury Diagram 
I 
Not to scale 
CM Miner Operator 
H Helper 
SC Shuttle Car Operator 
At the first mine site ten face crew members 
were interviewed. In an attempt to get a 
representative sample of face crew workers, 
participants were chosen from different sections and 
different shifts. Prior to collecting scenario data, 
background data on each participant was collected. 
All participants were assured that their responses 
would be held in confidence and that their 
participation was strictly voluntary. During the 
interview participants were encouraged to examine 
diagrams closely and to make sure they understood 
the conditions of the scenario. They were 
encouraged to draw on the diagrams and make 
diagrams of their own to clarify answers. Eight 
interviews were administered individually at various 
underground sites. One interview was conducted 
above ground and administered using flip chart 
sized diagrams to two members of the same crew. 
The above ground interview was conducted by 
three researchers concurrently. One ergonomist 
administered the interview and the other two 
facilitated data collections and respondent 
participation. Examination of results from the first 
mine revealed that the above ground results were 
superior in terms of the ability to accurately collect 
data and to elicit more in depth responses. 
Researchers felt that dialogs between the two 
workers allowed for a broad discussion of relevant 
safety issues. 
Interviews at the second and third mine sites 
were conducted above ground with face crew 
members from various sections that work the same 
shift. Large diagrams were posted on a wall and the 
groups sat facing the diagram. Again, all 
participants were assured that their participation 
was strictly voluntary and they were encouraged to 
use the diagrams when responding to questions. 
Twenty-two face crew members were interviewed at 
the two mine sites. At the second site two groups 
were interviewed, a group of three and a group of 
six. At the third site two groups were interviewed, a 
group of six and a group of seven. 
FINDINGS 
Findings consist of responses to questions that 
follow the background and fatal injury sections of 
the interview. Information from drawings was 
incorporated into responses. The findings presented 
are summaries of the most common responses to 
each question. 
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Background Responses 
As a CM operator on this section, 
Question 1: What concerns would you have 
before starting this cut? 
- With this mining setup and cut pattern, it would 
be hard for the CM operator to be well back from 
unsupported top and see face and avoid shuttle car 
- Where CM operator is standing a fall can occur 
- An offset bolt pattern increases the chances of 
being under unsupported top 
- A large unsupported roof area will be opened up 
as the turn is developed 
- Bolts are not close enough to rib 
- Curtain is too far from CM, the #2 entry is not 
getting ventilated and there would be too much dust 
at face 
Question 2: What can be done about these 
concerns? 
- CM operator should stand well back from 
unsupported top 
- Put ventilation and cable on right when take left 
turns so CM operator can work well back on right 
side of CM 
- Take a notch cut and bolt it before cutting turn 
- CM operator should check roof conditions and 
ask bolters for an assessment before cutting turn 
- Always bolt as tight to ribs as possible and use 
extra bolts used when you have an offset entry 
- You should shorten cut to 20 or 30 feet if you 
have concerns about conditions 
- Extend curtain closer to CM 
Question 3: Where would you position yourself 
to take this lift? 
- On the cable side and as close to the shuttle car 
as possible 
- In the center of the entry next to the shuttle car, I 
would let shuttle car operator know I was there, I 
might even be a little behind the shuttle car 
- Even with the rib line where cut was started but 
two rows of bolts over. If the distance is greater 
than 3 feet between rib and bolts, I won’t stand by 
rib. 
- Initially, on left rib further back from turn. You 
have room here since closer to rib and the shuttle 
car has room. When shuttle car moves in, move 
closer to shuttle car. 
- In a bolted notch cut if available 
- Where helper is on drawing, you need to be 
further back 
Fatal Injury Responses 
Question 1: Could this type of situation could 
occur at this mine? YES or NO 
- Thirty of thirty-two respondents said YES. 
- Two respondents said NO. Both No 
respondents were interviewed individually at the 
first mine site. 
The following comments were made regarding 
Why or why not 
- If CM operator not aware of mine conditions 
- If CM operator places himself in a dangerous 
location, it could happen anytime CM operator 
stands that close to unsupported top 
- Adequate bolting is important, when bolting 
inadequate a fall could happen anywhere 
- Whenever you have a significant offset bolt 
pattern 
- It would not happen here because we stand on 
right of CM when cutting turns to left and can stay 
well back from unsupported top 
Question 2: When would something like this 
most likely happen? 
- Bad roof conditions, the cut sequence, and 
people’s attitudes could all result in a situation like 
this one 
- Whenever you get off site lines that much 
- Sometimes operators get into a comfort zone 
and lose the edge in terms of awareness. 
- Whenever you run cable on left and make left 
turns 
- Whenever people are tired or in a hurry 
- If CM operator trying to get in position to see or 
focusing too much on what he is doing and not on 
mine conditions, it is hard to look at everything at 
same time 
Question 3: Have you had any special training 
that would have helped you to better assess this 
situation? YES NO 
- Responses were almost equally mixed between 
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YES and NO 
- None of the mines had a special training 
program 
- One of the mines sent a select group of face 
crew workers to other mines to observe their mining 
practices 
- In general, they learned from experience and 
received safety guidelines during annual retraining 
DISCUSSION 
Responses to background questions indicated 
that several significant concerns were easily 
identifiable: the offset entry, the bolt pattern, the 
mining setup and cut pattern, and the CM operator’s 
proximity to unsupported roof. Each mine had 
working conditions, equipment, and procedures that 
differed from those of the scenario. These 
differences influenced responses to questions 
regarding corrective actions or preferred methods. 
There was a definite preference for procedures that 
face workers were accustomed to using. It was 
generally believed that if the scenario mine had used 
procedures similar to their mine then the CM 
operator would have been able to work from a safer 
location. 
The fatal injury questions elicited more 
reflective and candid responses. Most participants 
indicated that this type of accident could occur at 
any mine given the right set of conditions. It was 
generally believed that if the CM operator had 
stayed well back from unsupported roof the fatality 
would not have occurred. The combination of an 
offset bolt pattern and working too close to 
unsupported roof was considered very dangerous. 
Although this question was not asked, several 
respondents reported having observed CM operators 
either at their current mine or at another mine 
working too close to unsupported top. 
Reaction to the scenario interview was 
universally positive. Participants were eager to 
share their thoughts and expressed interest in 
learning about other participant’s thoughts. They 
felt that the scenario presented circumstances that 
were realistic and easy to relate to. Interviews 
conducted in small groups with flip chart size 
diagrams were most effective. They provided a 
good forum for open discussion and debate of safety 
issues and concerns in a setting that permitted 
accurate and complete collection of responses. 
The approach presented is by no means a novel 
one. Variations of scenario-based interviewing 
have been used for many applications. It was the 
intent of the researchers to show that if a short but 
well crafted scenario was developed that it could be 
effective in acquiring candid and detailed responses 
from underground coal mine face crews. In 
particular, each underground mining environment 
has unique physical and operational characteristics 
but face many similar work scenarios. 
A subjective evaluation of the scenario results 
by the ergonomists who conducted this work 
concluded that the results exceeded expectations. In 
support of this evaluation was the universally 
positive feedback from participants and mine 
managers who received reports outlining the 
findings for their respective mines. Mine managers 
were genuinely pleased with both the quality and 
quantity of feedback garnered. 
Finally, the most useful outcome of this effort 
may be the utility of this approach as a training tool. 
Scenarios can be crafted as simple realistic stories 
using characteristics of recent serious injuries or a 
series of common less serious injuries. The 
mechanism can be used to educate the work force 
about the types of hazards that exist and injuries that 
have occurred. The end result would be to survey 
the work force about safety issues that are important 
to them as well as creating a participatory platform 
for hazard awareness and safe work practice 
training. It is hoped that this example provides a 
framework for others to further evaluate and utilize 
this approach in dynamic working environments. 
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